India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on June 5, 1987, the Indian Air Force airdropped food parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. At a time when the Sri Lankan government stated they were close to defeating the LTTE, India dropped 25 tons of food and medicine by parachute into areas held by the LTTE in a direct move of support toward the rebels.[
Weisman, Steven R. (5 June 1987). "India airlifts aid to tamil rebels". STEVEN R. WEISMAN (New York Times). .
A book on IPKF Operations in Sri Lanka:
Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold, written by Major General Harkirat Singh throws fresh insight on IPKF operations and identifies the gaps and pitfalls which lead to its failure. General Harkirat was the first General Officer Commanding (GOC) for the IPKF and gives a first hand account of the initial phase of the operation.
General Singh argues that the IPKF did not succeed in achieving its mandate because it `did not have a clear-cut aim'. The IPKF went into operation within hours of the Accord being signed without adequate planning and preparation. The politicians and bureaucrats, including RAW, failed to address the real issues on the ground. Education and communication with the rural people were further road-blocks of success with the peacekeeping intervention.
First secretary in the Indian High commission in Colombo conveyed to Prabakaran that Rajiv Gandhi was waiting
to meet him to discuss certain issues prior to signing the accord.
Prabakaran was delighted to receive this message and agreed to leave for New Delhi.
On his arrival in New Delhi, Prabakaran had preliminary discussion with the Prime minister on 28th July, 1987, he was lodged in room 518 of the Ashoka Hotel and awaited for another meeting with the prime minister, unaware that the latter was already in Colombo negotiating an agreement for which, J N Dixit, India's high commissioner in Srilanka had laid the ground, the Prime minister's visit was telecast live, and watching it the
LTTE leaders felt betrayed" - page 26
" On the night of 14/15 september 2987, I received a telephone call from Dixit, directing me to arrest or shoot Prabakaran when he came for the meeting. Telling Dixit that I would get back to him I placed a call to the OFC, Lt.Col. Gen. Depinder Singh directed me to tell Dixit that we as an orthodox army, did not shoot people in the back when they were coming for a meeting under white flag. I then spoke to Dixit in Colombo and conveyed the message emphasising that I would not obey his directive. I pointed out that LTTE supremo had beedn invited by the IPKF in order to find solution to the problems in the implementation of the Accord. Dixit replied "HE (Rajiv Gandhi) has given these instructions to me and the Army should not drag its feet, and you as the GOC, IPKF will be responsible for it"
- page 57.
